ACP Platform Principles Summary

These are in no order of importance please check out the full platform plank for full details if more details are listed in following sections.

Foreign Relations: Iran & North Korea

The United States must do everything it can to resolve its issues with Iran peacefully. The United States must not be goaded into a war with Iran unless it is absolutely necessary and even then it should be on our terms. There has been hostility between the United States and the Iranian regime for years for many reasons. Elements of the current Iranian regime are actively trying to goad the United States into war, maybe because of fear or because they feel we are too tied down militarily and are trying to weaken the U.S. It remains to be seen. There are two potential realties to the future of this situation: Iran will develop nuclear weapons and we will have to deal with that or the U.S. and its allies work with Iran to develop peaceful nuclear technology. The world cannot allow for Iran to build nuclear weapons because the Iranian regime has clearly advocated the destruction of other nations and their people. This cannot stand in the world; we must not let them have nuclear weapons for that reason. However, if Iran is interested in nuclear power for their own peaceful purposes the United States and it allies can help them with that. The following ACP supported plan makes sense because it offers real diplomacy with real solutions and results for the Iranian regime and the U.S. and its allies. Thus, the ACP supports:

1. The ACP supports having direct nation to nation negotiations with Iran regarding their nuclear program and involvement with Hezbollah.

a. Too negotiate is not weak it is sanity. True negotiations can lead great results and if they don’t we and the world will then know America and its allies did all it could diplomatically for peace.

2. The ACP supports also supports having our allies in Europe, Asia and the Middle East participate in negotiations with the United States.

3. The ACP believes in having all diplomatic and military options open to use if needed.

4. Enforce sanctions that will specifically target Iran’s offensive and military nuclear programs if Iran continues to not follow UN requests and rules.

5. Work with the United Nations and Iraq to have Iran sign a non aggression pact and non interference treaty in regards to the Republic of Iraq.

Turning Iran's Enrichment Activities into a Multilateral Program:

As a solution to the nuclear dispute, the US and its allies should propose turning Iran's national enrichment efforts into a multinational program. Under this approach, the Iranian government would agree to allow two or more additional governments (for example, France and Germany) to participate in the management and operation of those activities within Iran.[3] In exchange, Iran would be able to jointly own and operate an enrichment facility without facing international sanctions. Resolving the nuclear issue would, in turn, make it possible for Iran to enjoy a variety of other benefits such as membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), increased trade with Europe, access to badly needed equipment for its aviation and energy industries, and perhaps normalized relations with the United States.
A number of Iranian officials—including President Ahmadinejad himself—have already publicly endorsed a multilateral solution. Of course, Iran's concept of multilateral enrichment is likely to be different from an American or European version, but those differences could, we believe, be resolved in negotiations.
Proposals to bring nuclear programs under multilateral supervision are neither new nor few in number. Several models of multinational uranium enrichment have been successfully used in Europe. Applied to the Iranian case, a multilateral approach would allow Iran to continue to own its existing nuclear facilities and centrifuges; but the management and operation of those facilities would be shared with the other partner governments, and any new facilities and technology would be owned and managed jointly by the consortium. All the multinational partners would contribute financially to the establishment and operation of the program and would also share in any revenues coming from the sale of the fuel. Such an arrangement could take many different forms, but any version of it would likely be subject to the following conditions:

1. Iran would be prohibited from producing either highly enriched uranium or reprocessed plutonium. This is the most important principle in the proposal. If Iran cannot produce or acquire highly enriched uranium, it cannot build a nuclear weapon. If Iran's enrichment program is turned into a multilateral project, it makes it extremely difficult for Iran to produce highly enriched uranium.

2. No work on nuclear fuel, including research and development, could be conducted in Iran outside the multilateral arrangement. In addition, no institution, personnel, or facility associated with the Iranian military would be allowed to participate in the production of nuclear fuel or other nuclear activities.

3. Iran would fully implement the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which requires member nations to make their nuclear facilities subject to snap inspections, environmental sampling, and more comprehensive reporting requirements. Iran has already offered to go beyond the current safeguards of nuclear processes it adheres to, and it should be held to that offer. Inherent in any multilateral arrangement for Iran's nuclear program is a requirement for greater transparency, since Iran's foreign partners will need full access to records and personnel to carry out their management responsibilities.

4. Iran would commit itself to a program only of light water reactors (LWRs), which require uranium fuel enriched only to low levels and which, compared with other types of reactors, produce relatively small amounts of plutonium in the nuclear waste generated. This is a reasonable demand since the LWR is the de facto international standard.

5. There would be no withdrawal clause. These commitments would extend in perpetuity. Cancellation of the agreement would be understood as a signal that Iran is abandoning its peaceful use obligations and thus would be subject to the severest consequences, up to and most likely including military action.

6. No stockpiling of low-enriched uranium (LEU) would be permitted beyond what is reasonable given the number of existing or soon-to-be-completed reactors. This can be justified both on economic grounds (domestically and because of the potential impact of stockpiling on the international LEU market) and for concerns about stockpiles of nuclear materials.

Still, the proposal cannot be one-sided. Iran needs to get something out of such a deal. A proposal that is all restrictions and no benefits is unlikely to be appealing or sustainable. Iran would be giving up some degree of control over part of its program and should rightly expect something in return. Certainly the Iranian government will have to be able to show that a multilateral nuclear program is advantageous for Iran.

US negotiators should design a package that would create and encourage constituencies for this consortium approach—such as the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, which runs the country's civilian nuclear program—which have a clear self-interest in the success of a multilateral approach. As it stands, US policy is all about limiting or eliminating the functions of Iran's nuclear bureaucracy, so an Iranian nuclear agency can be expected to fight tooth-and-nail to resist the US and protect itself.
Under a multilateral program, Iranian scientists and engineers would benefit from the knowledge and experience of the international managers and staff sent to work at the facility. This expertise could help Iran address the current technical problems its engineers have encountered in trying to get their existing centrifuges to work at full capacity. More importantly, Iranian nuclear scientists and engineers would be able to be part of the international scientific community: for example, they could travel, exchange ideas with colleagues, and attend professional conferences without sanction or suspicion. The Iranian government would thus get something out of this arrangement and see a path where it can win with nonproliferation and lose with nuclear weapons.
In order to assure Iran that the multilateral nuclear facility has the full support of the international community, construction and operation of the facility should be authorized by a resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council. The resolution should also include a provision that any future move by Iran to nationalize the facility or withdraw from the NPT would automatically trigger punitive steps against Iran.

Text taken from http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21112 by William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering, Jim Walsh

North Korea:

1. The ACP supports having direct nation to nation negotiations with North Korea.

a. Negotiation is not weakness. It is sanity and it shows North Korea we are interested in peace and the rest of the world we are interested in peace.

2. The ACP supports also the continued efforts of the Six Party negotiations with North Korea.

3. Engage North Korea with our allies to agree to a permanent peace treaty officially ending the Korean War and demilitarizing the Korean Peninsula.

4. The ACP believes in having all diplomatic and military options open to use if needed